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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BOUNTIFUL STATE BANK, a Utah
corporation, FARMERS S T A T E
BANK, a Utah Corporation, SOUTH
DAVIS SECURITY BANK, a Utah
corporation, and DAVIS COUNTY
BANK, a Utah corporation,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
VS.

Case No. 11807

W. S. BRIMHALL, COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
and WALKER BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah corporation.
Defend ants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought in the District Court of
Salt Lake County by plaintiffs Bountiful State Bank,
Farmers State Bank, South Davis Security Bank and Davis
County Bank against W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner of
Financial Institutions of the State of Utah, and Walker
Bank & Trust Company, for review of a decision of the
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Commissioner of Financial Institutions granting an application of Walker Bank & Trust Company for permission
to establish a branch bank in Centerville, Davis County.
A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order of
the Commissioner is appended hereto. The review is
authorized by Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant Walker Bank & Trust Company's Motion
for Summary Judgment was granted by Judge Stewart
M. Hanson in a Memorandum Decision dated July 18,
1969 ( R. 41 ) , and thereafter Summary Judgment was
entered on July 29, 1969 (R. 46-4 7).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seeks to have the judgment of the lower
Court reversed and an Order entered setting aside the
Commissioner's Order, or in the alternative, reinstatement
of the action in the Court below with direction to enter
such Order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Walker Bank & Trust Company (hereafter "Walker Bank") filed its application for permission
to establish a bank branch in the vicinity of 1000 South
and
Street. Centerville, Davis County, on May 21,
1968. Timely written protests were filed by appellants
( R. 5 7-67) ancl a public hearing" ;1s hdcl by the respondent Commission<"r of Financial Institutions (hereafter referred to as the "Commissioner") . The hearing was concluded September 30. 1968.

As Davis County docs not contain a city of the first
class (Commissioner's Finding No. 8) a branch bank may,
by statute, only be established in that county in a city or
town which does not contain a bank as opposed to a
branch bank (Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended).
The site of respondent \Valker Bank's proposed branch is
within the city limits of Centerville in which is located a
branch of appellant Bountiful State Bank but in which no
unit bank is situated. The proposed site, however, is located away from the business and population center of
Centerville near the corporate limits of Bountiful, Davis
County, which city does contain banks as opposed to
branches and is directly between the main office of appellant Bountiful State Bank and its Centerville branch,
being less than one-half mile from the latter (Exhibit V).
It is undisputed that the existing banks in the area of
the proposed branch are offering adequate banking service
( R. 69, 4 72). Because of the nature of Centerville as a
"bedroom" for Salt Lake City, the banking activity in that
area is not of the magnitude that might be expected for
the population present ( R. 440-41 ) . Significantly, however, a survey conducted of the area by Dr. Milton P.
Matthews, a highly qualified expert (Exhibit A) called
by appellants at the hearing before the Commissioner
showed that although 21.3 percent of the families surveyed
had their main checking accounts in banks outside of
South Davis County and 28.6 percent of their second
checking accounts outside of that area (Exhibit G) none
of the 100 Centerville families surveyed, which constituted
a fair statistical sample of Centerville residents (R. 436),
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banked outside of the area because of any inadequacies in
the service rendered by the existing banks (R. 438).
Feeling aggrieved by the Commissioner's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions and Order dated February 28, 1969,
appellants instituted the subject suit as provided under
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and following
entry of the lower court's Summary Judgment this appeal
is taken.
ARGUMENT

I. BECAUSE THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
IGNORED THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED
BRANCH UPON THE OPERATIONS OF BOUNTIFUL STATE BANK, IT MUST BE SET ASIDE.
The Utah branch banking statute provides as follows:
The business of every bank shall be conducted
only at its banking house and every bank shall receive deposits and pay checks only at its banking
house except as hereinafter provided.
With the consent of the bank commissioner
any bank having a paid-in capital and surplus of
not less than $60,000 may establish and operate
one branch for the transaction of its business; provided, that for each additional branch established
there shall be paid in an additional $60,000 ( capital and surplus) .
All banking houses and branches shall be located either within the corporate limits of a city
or town, or within unincorporated areas of a
county in which a city of the first class is located.
Except in cities of the first class, or within
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unincorporated areas of a county in which a city
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall
be established in any city or t0\\11 in which is located a bank or banks, state or national, regularly
transacting a customary banking business, unless
the bank seeking to establish such branch shall take
over an existing bank. No unit bank organized and
operating at a point where there are other operating banks, state or national, shall be permitted to
be acquired by another bank for the purpose of
establishing a branch until such bank shall have
been in operation as such for a period of five years.
The term "branch" as used in this act shall be
held to include any branch bank, branch office,
branch agency, additional office, or any branch
place of business at which deposits are received or
checks paid or money lent.
Any bank desiring to establish one or more
branches or offices shall file a written application
therefor in such form and containing such information as the bank commissioner may reasonably
require. No bank shall be permitted to establish

any branch or office until it shall first havr been
shown to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner
that the public convenience and advantage will be
subserved and promoted by the establishment of
such branch or office. The bank commissioner may,

at his discretion, hold a public hearing on any application to establish a branch. He shall give notice
of such hearing by publication in three successive
issues in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county in which the branch is to be established.
The decision of the bank commissioner granting or
denying an application to establish a branch shall
be in writing, state the reasons therefor. and shall
be mailed to the applicant and all protestants.
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The bank. commissioner may by order permitting
the
of such branch or office designate and hm1t the character of work and service
which may therein be performed.
No branch shall be established at a location
outside the corporate limits of a city or town in
such close proximity to an established bank or
branch as to unreasonably interfere with the business thereof.

Any corporation or officer thereof violating
any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended (emphasis
supplied).
The proposed site of respondent Walker Bank's
branch is directly between the principal banking house of
appellant Bountiful State Bank and its Centerville branch
(Exhibit V), and within one-half mile of Bountiful State
Bank's Centerville branch (R. 383) and is so located, or
would be so located, that substantially all customer traffic directed to appellant's Centerville branch, which is
located in downtown Centerville, from the south must pass
by or near the proposed branch ( R. 194).
This intrusion between two of the banking offices of
protestant Bountiful State Bank is a factor which must be
considered in determining the public convenience and
advantage if the effect of the proposed branch would be
to unreasonably interfere with existing operations. This
is especially the case in view of the general banking provision which provides that the Commissioner
... may refuse to grant his approval ... when
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the. location or fi:IcI of operation of the proposed
busmess shall be m such close proximitv to an established business subject to this title· that such
establishcd business might be unreasonablv inter·
fered with . . .
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
Respondent's proposed branch would sirrnificantlv. interfcre with the operation of the existing Centerville
branch.

:r-.fr. L. C. Jeppsen, President of Bountiful State
Bank ( R. 3 79), testified that 90 percent of the savings
deposits and 83 percent of the checking deposits in dollar
volume of the Centerville branch of Bountiful State Bank
are from depositors who reside in Centerville ( R. 382)
which means that the greater bulk of that branch's
customers reside within one-half mile of the branch (R.
383). He further testified that the Centerville branch,
which had been in operation for about six years, had
been disappointing in its growth (R. 391). Indeed, the
during the first several years was nominal and
later growth has been at an even lesser annual rate. (R.
381). He testified that because of the natural loss in accounts that would result from the introduction of the
proposed branch (R. 401) and because of the advertising
of respondent Walker Bank ( R. 397) that the overall
impact of the opening of the proposed branch upon the
Bountiful State Centetville branch would be disastrous
(R. 383), that future growth of the branch would be
crippled (R. 397, 401) and that the main bank would
have to continue the burden of carrying the unprofitable
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branch ( R. 388) . This testimony is supported by the experience of appellant Davis County Bank upon the opening of Bountiful State Bank's Centerville branch ( stipulated testimony of Ezra T. Clark, President of appellant
Davis County Bank ( R. 469- 70) ) .
From the above it is submitted that the Commissioner's order must be set aside as a matter of law on the
ground that the proposed branch's interference with the
existing branch precludes a finding that the public convenience and advantage would be subserved thereby.
Even if the evidence does not preclude an order in
respondent Walker Bank's favor the Commissioner's order
should still be set aside. The only consideration given by
the Commissioner to this grim outlook for appellant Bountiful State Bank's branch was his finding that the stability
of the existing banks would not be jeopardized (Finding
No. 11) and his conclusion that there would not be unreasonable interference with operations or jeopardy to the
depositors of the existing banks (Conclusion No. 3). This
clearly indicates that the Commissioner is applying the
standard suggested by respondent Walker Bank (R. 47374, 484-86) that he need consider only the safety of the
existing banks and the protection of their depositors and
that he has not considered the healthy and profitable
opera ti on of the exising banks as is required in determining the public convenience and advantage and for this
failure to employ the proper standard of convenience and
advantage, the Commissioner's Order should be set aside
with instructions to him at a new hearing on this matter
to consider the impact of the operation of the proposed
branch upon the existing branch bank and existing unit
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banks and the effect of the proposed branch on the existing branch and banks insofar as such operation must be
inquired into to determine the public com·enience and
advantage.

II. BECAUSE THE C0:\11\llSSIONER FAILED
TO CONSIDER AND MAKE FINDINGS AND CONCLCSIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE MATERIAL
ISSUES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF
THE PROPOSED BRANCH AND THE IMPACT OF
THE PROPOSED BRANCH ON BOUNTIFUL
STATE BANK'S EXISTING BRANCH, HIS DECISION l\1UST BE SET ASIDE.
Fair treatment requires that appellants be accorded
opportunity for judicial review of the Commissioner's decision, and the right to review has been codified by Section 7-1-26 (4), U.C.A. 1953, as amended. The scope of
that review has also been set forth by the legislature in
that section, which provides that the "reviewing court
shall have power to hold unlawful and set aside any act,
decision or ruling of the bank commissioner found to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law."
To provide meaningful judicial review, giving substance to appellants' rights in this case, there is a requirement that appellants be permitted to participate in a fair
hearing and that thereafter the Commissioner make findings
conclusions setting forth the facts upon which
he relied and articulating the bases of his decision. In the
absence of such hearings, findings and conclusions there
is nothing upon which to base appellate review, or as
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stated by the Court in Zion's First National Bank v.
Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 239 at page 241:
... we arc of the opinion that a public hearing should be had in most, if not all, branch bank
applications. This is particularly true where a protest has been filed and there is a possibility of a
court review. Had such hearing been held in the
instant case, there would probably be an adequate
record for a court to review. As it is, the record
contains only the application and letter of First
Security, Zion's letter of protest, the report of the
examiner, and a copy of the certificate. Furthermore, while we realize that it is appropriate and
perhaps necessary for the Commissioner to make
ex parte investigations to aid him in making his
decision, the instant case is complicated by the fact
that he did not prepare any written findings or
reasons to support his action. The recitation in the
certificate that First Security "has complied with
all the provisions of Section 7-3-6" does not supply
this deficiency.
Here there is no lack of public hearing, but there is
glaring absence of "written findings or reasons to support
his action."
The branch operations of banks within the State of
Utah are governed by a scheme which is prohibitory and
restrictive in nature, as appears from reading the principal
branching statute, set forth at page 4, supra, and Section 7-3-6.3, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, which provides
that:
From and after the effective date of this act
no unit bank and no branch bank shall be established or authorized to conduct a banking business
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except as hercinbcfore m section 7-3-6 expressly
provided.
and this court has so held in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v.
Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 236-37.
It is apparent that the legislature has intended that
banking competition in a city or town which contains a
unit bank and which is located in a county which docs not
contain a city of the first class must be limited to competition from new unit banks and that no competition may be
permitted through the entry of branch banks into the city.
The purpose of this limitation appears to be for the protection of the established unit banks, or as was stated by
the Court in Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, supra,
at 237:
In 1911, the legislature enacted a statute
which absolutely prohibited branch banking. It
was not until 1933 that the legislature relaxed this
prohibition and permitted branching under certain
conditions and circumstances. During the period
between 1911 and 1933 the legislature evidently
was of the opinion that branch banking ,.,·as not in
the public interest, possibly because it might impair the stability of the existing banks. This reasoning could well have influenced the law makers
when they saw fit to allow branch banking, but
only under certain restrictive conditions. [footnotes
omitted]

As Centerville does not have located within its corporate limits a unit bank, the Commissioner may permit
the opening of a branch bank within that city if he finds
that the public convenience and advantage will be sub-
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served thereby, but he cannot permit the openmg of a
branch bank in the city of Bountiful.
One of the issues presented to the Commissioner is
\-vhethcr he should, or could approve the application when
the obvious design of the application is to compete in
Bountiful, but the technical corporate location of the
branch is within the city of Centerville. The proposed site
of respondent Walker Bank's application is located at the
edge of the city of Centerville, directly adjacent to the
city limits of Bountiful, as appears from examination of
Exhibit V. This location is a\'\'ay from the residential and
business center of Centerville, as can be seen through
examination of Exhibits B through F, and U, in conjunction with the testimony of Dr. l\1atthews (R. 421-23),
and it also appears that any logical expansion of the city
of Centerville will be to the north ( R. 425) rather than
southward toward the city of Bountiful. Indeed, there
would appear no need for a second branch bank in the
city of Centerville in view of its 1967 population as estimated by respondent Walker Bank of only 3,434 (Exhibit
1, p. 20) .1

The obvious and clear deduction from this physical evidence is
that the intent of respondent Walker Bank in filing its Application is
to compete in the Bountiful area rather than within the city of Centerville. This obvious deduction is confirmed by the testimony of
respondent Walker Bank's witness at the hearing before the Commissioner. Mr. Robert E. Roll testified at that hearing that he felt
the propoer location for the branch would be in a proposed shopping
center located within the city of Bountiful:
1

Q. [Mr. Moyle] At what time were you first consulted as to the establishment of a branch bank in Davis
County?

At the administrative hearing, respondent \\'alker
Bank took the position that its branch \\·as to sen-c the
entirety of South Da\"is Countv. and onlv, incidentalh' Ccntcn,illc and that so long as their proposed branch bank
was to be located \\"ithin the corporate limits of Centerville, the Commissioner could not deny the application
Footnote, 1011ti1111ed
:\. [ !\ 1r. Roll] If I may be so hold, I saw this article
that wP talkC'd about C'arliPr
this tl'n million
dollar shopping CC'lltl'r for PPnnq·s in Bountiful then· and at
that point I approadwd managcml'nt and said. "I think this
would he a good plact' for a branch bank." Thl'y said. "Why
don't you run somt' preliminary figures on it and see what
you come up with?"

Q. [Mr. Moyle] Let's make it clear. Then you made
this suggestion after you read about the Bountiful Shopping
Center as it appeared in the newspaper?
A.

Roll] Yes.

(R. 162)

Q. [Mr. Moyle] All right, your first interest was one
that you created among yourselves - it may well have been
other people in the bank were also working along these
lines, but your first indication was a newspaper article regarding the Bountiful Shopping Center and you thought the
Bountiful Shopping Center might justify a branch bank?
A. [Mr. Roll] Justify a branch bank, yes.

(R. 163)
This preference for Bountiful was confirmed_ b_y
testimony
of 1\,1. D. Borthick, a member of the general adm1mstrat1ve staff of
respondent Walker Bank (R. 194), who
stated
the hearing that he would prefer the branch to. be in
shopping center
( R. 232-33), which from the surrounding testimony. of Mr .. Borthick indicates the proposed shopping center located in the city of
Bountiful.
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even if the Commissioner determined that the branch was
established for the purpose of competing in Bountiful or
other areas outside Centerville and the location was selected solely for the purpose of avoiding legislative policy
(see, R. 480-84). Appellants took the contrary position
arguing that under the evidence presented the proposed
location was contrary to the law and even if not the Commissioner had the discretion to deny the application if he
determined granting the application would defeat the
legislature's purposes without compensating benefits to the
to the public (R. 500-01). Despite the presentation of
evidence and argument as to this material issue, the Commissioner's findings and conclusions are silent as to it.
This silence is in the face not only of appellants' general
right to review, but the legislative command that the
Commissioner must give his decision granting or denying
the application in writing and state the reasons therefor
(Section 7-3-6, U.C.A.1953, as amended).
Since the presentation of the subject application to
the Commissioner this court has decided Walker Bank &
Trust Co. v. Brimhall, No. 11628, November 20, 1969,
____________ Utah 2d ------------, ____ P. 2d ------------, holding that
in the continguous metropolitan area of Ogden and South
Ogden a similar "over the line" application by \iValker
Bank could not be denied on geographical grounds alone
in that case. This court then limited its holding by stating
... Nonetheless, it seems to us that geography,
in a given case, could be some sort of a factor con-
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tribuiting to 'public convenience and advantage'
established 'to the satisfaction' of the
sioner ... -·-----·---- Utah 2d at ____________ , ---------------·
P.2d at --------------------·
The differences between the metropolitan Ogden
area and the area surrounding respondent's proposed site
herein are many and obvious. South Ogden and Ogden
are part of a contiguous and continuous metropolitan area.
In that area Walker Bank and Trust Company, the largest
state bank in Utah and a subsidiary of the massive Western Bancorporation holding company (Exhibit Z), was
attempting to enter an active commercial-industrial area
in competition with such existing major banks as First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. and Commercial Security
Bank. Centerville, on the other hand, is a separate and
distinct residential community (see Exhibits B through F)
and it and the nearby cities and towns are serviced essentially by local banks, the protestants herein. It is impossible
for this court because of the Commissioner's failure to
make findings and conclusions on this issue to determine
whether the proper standard has been applied. Failure
of the Commissioner to make findings after issue was
joined on this issue is ground for setting his order aside.
The failure of a trial court to make findings on
material issues is reversible error.
We pass now to a consideration of the second
assignment of error, i.e., the failur.e o.f the
to make findings of fact on certam issues. It IS
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well settled in this jurisdiction that failure to make
findings of fact on material issues is error, and
is ordinarily prejudicial. Dillion 9-12 Implement
Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 1, 88 P. 670; Holm v.
Holm, 44 Ctah 242, 139 P. 937; Snyder et al. v.
Allen et al., 51 Utah 291 ,169 P. 9·Vi; Hall et al v.
Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P. 1110; Baker v. Hat ch,
70 lTtah 1, 25 7 P. 673; Prows v. H awlcy et al.,
72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; Simper v. Brown, 72 Utah
178, 278 P. 529; Piper v. Eakle, 78 Utah 342; 2 P.
2d 909; TV est v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300,
17 P. 2d 292; Parowan /If ercantile Co. v. Gurr et
al., 83 Utah 463, 30 P.2d 207; Pike v. Clark, 95
Utah 235, 79 P.2d 1010. Failure to make findings
on material issues is not prejudicial, if no findings, other than in support of the judgment would
have been permissible. Sheppick v. Sheppick et
al., 44 Utah 131, 137, 138 P. 1169; Snyder v. Allen,
supra; Piper v. Eakle, supra. And of course failure to make findings upon immaterial issues, or
issues which would not affect the judgment of
the court, is not ground for reversal. Hall et al.
v. Sabey, supra; Mills v. Gray, 50 Utah 224, 167
P. 358; Gray v. Defa, 107 Utah 272, 153 P. 2d 544;
Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah, 363, 145 P.2d 780 ....
Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 269-70.
The same reasoning which applies to a trial court
must be even more strongly applicable to the Commissioner of Financial Institutions. In order to determine
whether the Commissioner's actions were lawful, the
reviewing court must be aware of the legal standards
against which the Commissioner measured respondent
Walker Bank's application.
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There is no basis other than speculation upon v•hich
\VC can conclude the reasons for which the Commissioner
omitted to make findings and conclusions with respect to
this issue, and under such circumstances. we cannot conclude that the Commissioner was not operating under a
misconception of the applicable law. This must be contrasted with the situation which was presented to this
court in Walker Bank & Trust Company v. Brimhall,
supra, wherein the Commissioner made a specific conclusion as to this issue as set forth in the opinion of Justice
Ellett, concurring and consenting (concurred in by Chief
Justice Crockett) permitting the court in its opinion to
specifically determine the grounds upon which the Commissioner acted.
A situation, similar to the one herein, involving a failure to make findings and conclusions with respect to a
principal issue was presented to this court in Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 581. In reviewing a decision of the Industrial Commission, Chief Justice
Wolfe, speaking for the court, determined that the Commission had ignored one of the basic issues presented at
the hearing:
As already indicated, the finding quoted above
is subject to a second interpretation. That is, it may
be construed as relating only to the question of the
origin of the fight. If
.interpretatio.n is. accepted, then there is no fmdmg on the
as to whether or not the applicant was actmg m
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violation of the rule for there is no specific
fmdmg that he had the permission of foreman or
assistant foreman to take the screens. Under such
an interpretation the cast' must be reversed for we
cannot assume that the Commission, if it had made
a finding on this issue, \\'ould have resolved the conflict in favor of the applicant.
103 Utah at 587
and further:
... The record, when taken as a whole, indicates that the Commission did not consider the
first aspect of the case, that is, whether the breaking of the rule by the applicant for reasons tantamount to being personal to himself itself constituted a departure. There would, therefore, be no
logical or reasonable basis for assuming that the
Commission would have found either one way or
the other on the conflicting evidence relating
to the applicant's knowledge of the rule, or, if he
had knowledge of the rule, that its effect had been
suspended by permission given to take the screens.
103 Utah at 588.
The Court's opinion was later modified at 103 Utah
595. The Chief Justice there indicated that the case was
based in part on an indication in the Commission's findings which led the court to believe that had the Commission considered the issue, they would have reached a different conclusion. In view of the complete absence of findings or conclusions in the instant case touching upon the
issue of geographic location, the court cannot conclude
that the Commissioner would have reached a conclusion
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in favor of respondent \\'alkcr Bank in \·ic\\· of the evidence presented . .Judicial rn·iew of the aclministrati\'e
hearing can only assure protestants of the enforcement of
their rights if the re,·iewing court determines that the
proper legal bases were applied to the facts as presented.
Had the Commissioner made findings of fact with respect
to this issue, then it could be determined upon re\'iew if
the proper standard had been applied or, in the alternative, if the wrong standard was applied, whether or not
application of the correct standard would change the results in view of the facts found. In this instance, however,
there is no recourse but to set aside the Commissioner's
order with instructions to him, should a new application
be made by respondent Walker Bank, to consider the application under guidelines set forth by this court in Walker
Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall, supra, and herein as to the
legal requirements to be considered.
The identical reasoning applies to the issue of the
impact of the proposed branch upon the Centerville
Branch of Bountiful State Bank. Once again diametrically opposed legal bases were proposed by appellants
and respondent Walker Bank. The latter argued that the
profitability of the existing branch and even the prof itability of Bountiful State Bank taken as a whole was not
an issue which could be properly considered by the Commissioner, that he was limited in his consideration only to
the determination of whether or not the deposits of the
public in the bank were secure and whether or not the
bank could survive (R. 473-74, 484-86). Apellants, on
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the other hand, argued that profitability of both the
bank as a whole and its Centerville branch were factors
to be considered by the Commissioner in determining the
effect of the proposed branch on the public convenience
and advantage (R. 501-02). Evidence was squarely presented on the issue, and the overwhelming evidence supports the proposition that the proposed branch, if opened,
would have a disastrous effect upon the operation of
the existing Centerville branch. Once again, there is a
complete absence of findings and conclusions by the
Commissioner as to what legal standard he applied in
reaching his decision, and it is improper to assume in
view of the evidence that he would have found in favor of
respondent Walker Bank had he applied the legal principles presented by appellants in Point I above. For the
benefit of the public and the Commissioner in later applications of the branch banking statute as well as this,
it is necessary that the Court set aside the Commissioner's order with instructions to him as to the legal guidelines applicable to branch banking applications.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the
Order of respondent Commissioner was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; that the Court below improperly entered
Summary Judgment against appellants, and that the decision of the Court below should be reversed and an
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Order entered herein setting aside the Commissioner's
Order, and awarding appellants their costs herein.
Respectfully submitted.

OSCAR W.
JR.
0. \VOOD MOYLE III
of Moyle & Moyle

RENDALL N. MABEY

of Mabey, Bradford & Marsden

Attorneys for Appellants

App. I
STATE OF UTAH
Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions
Salt Lake City
In the l\1atter of the Application of
FINDINGS OF
WALKER BANK & TRl,TST
p ANY for permission to establish a
FACT,
branch bank in the vicinity of 1000 CONCLUSIONS
South and Main Street, Centerville, AND ORDER
Davis County, Utah.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. That on l\1ay 21, 1968, Walker Bank & Trust Company, 175 South :Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
filed with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions
its application for permission to establish a branch
bank on the vicinity of 1000 South and 1i1ain Street,
Centerville, Davis County, Utah, using a branch bank
application form prescribed by the Commissioner.
2. That the Commissioner had notice of the above application mailed to all banks in Davis County and
others and he had notice of the application published
in three successive issues of The Salt Lake Tribune,
a newspaper having general circulation in the Davis
County, Utah, commencing :May 25, 1968.
3. That written protests to the granting of this application were received from Farmers State Bank, South
Davis Security Bank, Davis County Bank, Bountiful
State Bank, Clearfield State Bank, North Davis Bank,
and Barnes Banking Company.
4. That the Commissioner called a public hearing for
consideration of the application to be held in Room
303, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, at
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ten o'clock a.m. on September 25, 1968. He had notice
of the hearing mailed to all banks located in Davis
County and others and published notice of the hearing in three successive issues of The Salt Lake Tribune, commencing September 6, 1968. The hearing
was held as noticed and was continued on September
26 and September 30, 1968, on which latter date it
was concluded.
5. That applicant was represented at the hearing by its
Attorney, H. R. Waldo, Jr., of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. Counsel representing protestants at the hearing were: 0. Wood 'Moyle III of
Moyle & Moyle for Farmers State Bank, Charles E.
Bradford of Bradford & Forbes for South Davis
Security Bank, Gordon A. Madsen for Bountiful
State Bank, Keith L. Stahle for Davis County Bank,
and Raymond W. Gee for Clearfield State Bank.
Others who had filed written protests to the application were not represented at the hearing.
6. That the filing of written briefs with the Commissioner was waived by attorneys for both the applicant
and the protestants who appeared at the hearing and
no such briefs were filed.
7. That Walker Bank & Trust Company is one of the
oldest and largest state chartered banks in the State
of Utah. Its main office is in Salt Lake City and it
has twelve branches in Salt Lake County (eleven of
which arc presently operating) and branches in Price,
Provo and Logan which are presently operating.
8. That Centerville is a city of the third class and there

are no banks (as distinguished from branches of
banks) located within the city limits of said city.
There is no city of the first class in Davis County.

9. That applicant bank has capital and surplus of not
less than $60,000 for each branch it is presently oper-
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ating and an additional $60,000 of such capital and
surplus for the proposed branch (Exhibit 1, page 49).
10. That the proposed branch would be located on a
parcel of .land fronting on 1000 South (Pages Lane)
near the mtersection of that street with
Street
(State Highway No. 106). Such parcel of land is
located entirely within the city limits of Centerville
'
Davis County, Utah.
11. That there are within the city limits of Centerville
a branch of the Bountiful State Bank but no other
banks or branches. Other banks or branches in South
Davis County (that part of Davis County south of
the Farmington cross-roads - Tr. 26-27), the dates
such banks or branches were organized or established
and the distance of such banking facilities from the
proposed branch of applicant are as shown on page
59 of Exhibit 1, Table IV-10. All of such banks and
branches have operated from the locations indicated
a sufficient period of time to have an established
business at such locations. All of the banks operating
in South Davis County are financially stable and secure institutions and such stability would not be
jeopardized or the interests of the public impaired
by the establishment and operation of the proposed
branch. Existing banks have been able to compete
successfully with other financial institutions and
South Davis Security Bank, established in May of
1963, was able to enter the area, become established
and increase its loans, deposits and resources without
preventing the other banks in the area from increasing their loans, deposits and resources also (Exhibit
1, Chapter IV, pp. 42-64; Tr. 254, 260-263, 265-268,
270-271, 275-276, 301-304, 312-315, 339). Total resources of all South Davis County banks increased
from $22,600,000 December 31, 1963, which was the
last year of entry of a new unit bank into the area, to
$34,250,000 December 31, 1967.

App. IV
12. That
propos_cd branch would supply the full range
of bankmg scf\·ices offered hy the applicant bank in
its other banking offices. including clrin·-in tellers'
windows, safe-deposit boxes, checking and sa\·ings
accounts, the \\' alker Bankard (a bank credit card
sef\·ice), access to the trust department opnations
of the applicant bank (Tr. 142, 148) and inter-branch
transactions (Tr. 319-3 20) .
13. That the applicant bank has a lending limit to any one
person or corporation of approximately $2,865,000
(Tr. 77). In the South Davis County area, the
lending limit of any of the existing banks is approximately $90,000 (Tr. 77). The ratio of banking facilities to population indicates that there are fewer banking facilities in the South Davis County area to serve
population than in the State as a
(Exhibit
1. p. 50; Tr. 80-81, 101-103, 411-412).
14. That applicant has a number of existing customers
residing or having officers or places of business in
South Davis County and Centef\•ille (Tr. 16-24, 86,
89-90; Exhibit 7).
15. That the financial condition and history of the applicant bank and its management demonstrate its
capacity to successfullv manage and operate the proposed branch.
16. It appears that the economic effect of the proposed

branch and its sources of business would include all
of the Centerville. Farmington Bountiful. \Vest
Bountiful. \Voods Cross. North Salt Lake. and unincorporated areas of South Davis Count\' (Ex. 1,
pp. 2. 16; Tr. 26-27. 119-121 ) . This area has experienced a substantial growth in recent years. as meassurcd bv new
(Tr. 72-71). emplo)ment,
wages.
and
tax collections (Ex. 1, pp. 1618 .. 41; Ex. 8-12; Tr. 126-135. 191-210. 378-380. 399-
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406). Population has incrca1.,ed substantially (Ex. 1
pp.
81-83; Tr. l'.!.3-126, ?7-t-:n7,
7)
and estimates of future population for the area indicate a substantial growth (Ex. 1, pp. 18, 21, 125-126
309, 354-355, 398). Growth of the economy in
future is likely to continue (Ex. 1 pp. 18, 29: 33, 40·
Tr. 72-74, 204, 206-209, 268-270, 275, 309-310, 345)'.

CONCLUSIONS

1.

Due notice of the receipt of this application has
been given as required by law and a hearing was
held as permitted by law.

2.

The applicant bank has the necessary capital and
surplus to permit the establishment of an additional
branch bank.

3.

The Commissioner finds that because of the substantial economic growth in South Davis County
in recent years, increased competition from the proposed branch bank would not unreasonably interfere
with the operation of the existing banks and branches
which are located in this area. It would not jeopardize the depositors of such banks, would not interfere
with the abilitv of these banks to maintain their
financial strength and would not impair their ability
to compete with the applicant bank and other banks.
The vitality of this area is demonstrated by new
industry and building in the area and increases in
employment, wages, income and sales tax collections.
Population has increased substantially and is likely
to continue in the future. In 1967, South Davis
County had a population per banking office of in
excess of 7,200 people and the State as a whole had
a population per banking office at that time of 6,247.
An additional banking facility to serve this expanding economy would subserve and promote the public
convenience and advantage.
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t.

The public COil\'cnicnce and .Hh-anta!.!c would be subscn-cd and promoted hy the establishment of the
proposed branch at the location proposed and there
is no reason to limit the character of work or scn·icc
to he performed at such branch. Applicant bank has
a number of existing custonwrs rcsidin!.! or ha\'ill!.!
offices in or places of business sen·ing South Da\'is
Count\' and it would be for the comTnicncc and to
the advantage of such customers that the proposed
branch be located in the area. Furthermore. if the
proposed branch bank is established. the general
public would be afforded the choice of another banking facility with substantially larger lending limits
than any other bank in the area.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Commissioner of Financial lnstitutiom hereby makes the following

ORDER

The application of \Valker Bank & Trust Company
for permission to establish a branch bank in the City of
Centerville. Davis County, Utah. in the vicinity of 1000
Street and Main Street is hereby approved.
Dated at Salt Lake CitY. l 1tah. this '.!8th day of
1'1·hruar\'. 1969.
\V. S. Brimhall. Commissioner
State Department of Financial
Institutions

